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The existence of a shadow economy has potentially serious implications for economic perfor-
mance and public revenues. Public nances can suer as the tax base shrinks, thus weakening the
government's capacity to generate revenue. Growth prospects can be compromised by encumbrances
to doing business due to lack of infrastructure. For these reasons a substantial volume of research has
been directed towards understanding the factors that contribute to the size of a shadow economy.
By its very nature, the underground economy is dicult to study empirically. Nevertheless, there
has been a good deal of progress on developing techniques to quantify its size and importance. Whilst
disagreement persists regarding the appropriate methodology1, the general conclusion is that the
extent of informal activity is substantial across countries. According to Schneider (2007), between
1999 and 2005, underground activities did account for nearly 16 % of GDP in the OECD nations.
The equivalent numbers are far larger (about 35 %) in the emerging and developing countries. A
similar conclusion has been reached by Lack o (1998), Alm, Mart nez-V azquez and Schneider (2004)
and Kazemier (2005)).
For most part, the existing literature focuses on various aspects of public policy and public ad-
ministration as creating incentives to participate in underground activities. Included among these
are burden, complexity, perceived fairness of tax systems, the burden of social security contributions,
the extent of bureaucracy and regulations, and the incidence of corruption and rent seeking (e.g.
Schneider (1994), Loayza (1996) Johnson et al. (1998a, 1998b), Friedman et al. (2000), Schneider
(2007))2. Without undermining the importance of any of these factors we focus on another deter-
minant { the level of nancial development { that has received relatively much less attention both
in empirics and in theory.
Our focus on nancial development is anchored in a simple economic argument. For example,
consider an individual who, for purposes of production or consumption, seeks a certain amount of
credit from a market that is plagued with informational frictions between borrowers and lenders.
Before applying for a loan, an agent must decide how much of her current income to declare publicly.
While this declared income is subjected to taxation, it can either be used as collateral or it can serve
as a signal to lenders about the creditworthiness of a prospective borrower. Accordingly, the amount
of declared income along with other characteristics of the credit market would jointly determine the
probability of obtaining credit together with its terms and conditions. Naturally, one would expect
1For a discussion of the various available estimation methods see Schneider and Enste (2002)
2This list is far from comprehensive. For an extensive literature review see Schneider and Enste (2000)
2that in a low state of nancial development that is characterized by scarcity of loanable funds, lack
of competition among nancial intermediaries, high level of nancial repression and limited ability
of lenders to collect and process information, an increase in the size of one's publicly declared income
is likely to have a smaller impact on the terms and conditions of lending than what would transpire
in an advanced state of credit market development. Consequently, an individual would be less prone
to declare her income and/or wealth in a low state of nancial development, thus giving rise to a
larger shadow economy.
The above idea complements a small body of research that suggests possible connections between
the credit market and the size of a shadow economy. For example, Dabla-Norris and Feltenstein
(2005) construct a computable dynamic general equilibrium model for the purpose of estimating the
impact of taxes on underground activities and other macroeconomic phenomena in Pakistan. Their
numerical results suggest that an increase in taxes may not only cause rms to operate underground,
but, in doing so, may also lead to a reduction in the amount of collateral in the formal sector, and
with this a reduction in the volume of loans and subsequent investment in that sector. Straub (2005)
proposes a theoretical analysis where an agent's decision to participate in a formal versus informal
credit market is shaped by the interaction between the cost of entry into formality and the relative
eciency of formal versus informal credit mechanism. In a similar vein, Antunes and Cavalcanti
(2007) argue that an agent's occupational choice { being either a worker, a formal or an informal
entrepreneur { is in
uenced by entry barriers (regulation costs) and credit market imperfections.
Simple economic intuition together with the views expressed by above researchers provides us
with sucient reason to undertake a formal empirical investigation into the relationship between the
level of credit market development and the size of a shadow economy. Our analysis is based on data
for 119 countries from 1999/2000 to 2004/2005. We naturally control for those variables that have
already been identied in the literature as determinants of an underground economy. In addition, we
pay attention to the \sensitivity" issue arising from initial conditions and conditioning variables while
also recognizing and correcting potential endogeneity bias in our nancial development indicators.
The main results of our analysis suggest that:
(1) An improvement in the development of the banking sector is associated with a smaller
shadow economy in a wide cross-section of countries. This result is robust to a variety of specications
and is neither driven by multi-colinearity nor endogeneity of the nancial variables.
(2) At a disaggregated level, both the depth of the banking sector and its eciency matter
equally in reducing the size of a shadow economy.
3The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 brie
y describes the data. In
Section 3 we report the baseline regression results together with the results from the sensitivity and
endogeneity tests. Section 4 concludes with some remarks.
2 Data
2.1 The Size of the Shadow Economy
It is dicult to measure the size of a shadow economy by its concealed nature. To obtain an
estimate, researchers have used various approaches and each approach has its own strengths and
weaknesses (please refer to Schneider and Enste (2000) for a detailed overview). Out of several
available options, we draw our information on the size of shadow economies for 119 countries for
the period 1999/2000 to 2004/2005 from the most comprehensive estimates proposed by Schneider
(2007). His original study provides estimates for 145 countries. However, we are unable to consider
the full list due to limited information on other control variables. In the data appendix, we include
the list of countries and a brief description of the methodology employed to estimate the size of a
shadow economy.
2.2 Measures of Financial Market Development
Our main hypothesis suggests that availability of credit together with the terms and conditions
of lending are important determinants of the size of a shadow economy. Thus, it seems appropriate
to focus on indicators of banking development. Existing literature suggests a number of variables
that capture depth and ineciencies of a banking system. We focus on seven such variables that
are commonly used and extract information on these variables from two data sources { the nancial
database compiled by Beck, Demirg u c-Kunt and Levine (2000, 2006, henceforth, BDL) and the
World Bank World Development Indicators (WDI). Next, we follow the methodology proposed by
Calomiris and Beim (2001) and use these variables to construct two indices which correspond to
a measure of banking depth and a measure of banking ineciency3. In particular, we construct
the index of banking depth on the basis of annual averages of three variables - credit provided to
the private sector, total domestic credit provided by the banking sector and liquid liabilities (M3),
all as percentage of GDP. Each of these variables is used to measure the volume of lending by the
3The details of such methodology are provided in the data appendix.
4banking sector (see e.g. Levine and Zervos (1998)). Whereas, we construct the index of ineciencies
present in the banking sector on the basis of annual averages of four variables - bank overhead costs,
the net interest margin, the lending-deposit rate spread, and the value of central bank assets as
percentage of both central and private bank assets (see e.g. Barth, Caprio and Levine (2002)). In
practice, the terms and conditions of lending are in
uenced by a number of factors such as the
level of nancial repression, the extent of informational friction in the credit market, the quality of
banking regulations etc. The overall eect of these factors usually is visible in the value of these
four variables. Finally, to capture the overall quality of a banking system, we create a composite
index of banking development by averaging the scores of the above two indices. We include all three
indices in our analysis to evaluate the impact of banking development both at an aggregated and at
a disaggregated level.
2.3 Other Control Variables
A rm or an individual going underground is able to avoid taxation, labor costs and other
regulatory burdens that are present in the ocial sector. At the same time, a decision to go
underground comes at a cost of being excluded from various public services. Also, there exists a
chance of being detected by the authority, and, hence facing punishment for going underground.
Accordingly, policy, institutional, and regulatory variables such as the burden, fairness, and the
complexity of tax system, the extent of bureaucracy and regulation, the eectiveness of the rule of
law, and the burden of social security contribution (e.g. Schneider (1994), Loayza (1996) Johnson
et al. (1998a, 1998b), Friedman et al. (2000), Schneider (2007)) have received much attention in
the literature as potential determinants of underground activities. Naturally, we control for these
variables. We do so by including the Heritage Foundation Regulatory Freedom Index, the Heritage
Foundation Fiscal Freedom Index, the World Bank Regulatory Quality Index, the World Bank Rule
of Law Index, and the Transparency International Corruption Perception Index as control variables.
In addition, we use a number of other factors such as the level of economic development, degrees of
openness, and other proxies of nancial development to check robustness of our results. The detail
descriptions and sources of these variables are included in the data appendix.
53 Results
3.1 Basic OLS
We begin by regressing the average size of shadow economies for the period 1999/2000 -
2004/2005 against the averages of the overall measure of banking development for a cross-section of
119 countries. As additional controls, we include average scores of the Regulatory Freedom Index,
the Fiscal Freedom Index, the Regulatory Quality Index, the Rule of Law Index, and the Corruption
Index. At this stage we do not attempt to control for endogeneity and estimate our empirical model
using ordinary least squares. As summarized in the rst column of Table 1, our ndings suggest
that banking development has a signicant impact in reducing the size of shadow economies. For
instance, a one-point increase in the index of banking development causes the size of shadow econ-
omy as fraction of GDP to decrease by roughly 0.35 percentage points. For a clearer picture, we
further disaggregate the overall measure of banking development and include the index of banking
depth and the index of banking ineciencies separately in the regression. The results (column 2
of Table 1) indicate that both indicators of banking development have a signicant impact on the
size of shadow economy. A one-point increase in banking depth leads to a 0.115 percentage point
decrease in the size of the unocial sector. Similarly, a one-point increase in banking ineciencies
results in a 0.251 percentage point increase in the size of the shadow economy.
As noted earlier, we constructed indices of banking development on the basis of seven commonly
used nancial indicators. While these composite indices conveniently convey an overall picture, they
say little about the relative importance of these seven indicators in reducing the size of a shadow
economy. In addition, one cannot exclude the possibility that there could exist other nancial
indicators with signicant explanatory power. Accordingly, we repeat the baseline regression by
including a wider list of banking sector indicators, one at a time, in place of our composite index of
banking development. Instead of reporting all the results, we only report the relevant coecients
in Table 2. The results indicate that the coecients of all three measures of banking depth assume
the correct sign and are signicant at one percent level. Three out of four variables that we used
to construct the index of ineciencies in the banking industry - public bank assets, the interest
rate spread and the net interest margin - appear signicant at a minimum of ve percent level with
expected signs. In comparison, the remaining variables have insignicant impact on the size of a
shadow economy.
We nd that the rule of law is the only institutional variable that has a signicant explanatory
6power for the size of shadow economy. We do not interpret this result to say that other control
variables are of little signicance. We suspect that the source of this result lies in the fact that
institutional variables such as regulatory quality and the rule of law are correlated to each other.
When we include each measure separately4, all of them appear signicantly and with correct signs
as identied in the existing literature. Only when all of them are included simultaneously, the rule
of law remains signicant alone. Such a result is not uncommon in the literature (see e.g. Johnson
et al. (1998a) or Friedman, et al. (2000)).
Finally, we nd that the size of the shadow economy is positively correlated with the scal
freedom index. While this result may appear counter-intuitive at the surface, it need not be the
case. The existing literature (e.g. Friedman, et al. 2000) suggests that it is the low quality of
governance which creates incentives for individuals to go underground thus causing a reduction in
the tax revenue. Since the Heritage Foundation Fiscal Freedom Index is at least partly based on
the tax revenue, we are not surprised to observe a positive correlation between the value of this
index and the size of shadow economies. We, however, recognize that this result does not provide a
sucient basis for drawing any denite conclusion about the relation between the tax burden and
the size of the shadow economy. For that, one would require a more detailed picture of the scal
system that includes not only the information about the tax rates, but also the information about
various options for legal tax avoidances5 . Here, we refrain from undertaking such a detail exercise
and simply use the Fiscal Freedom Index as a broad control for the scal measures in the pursuit of




To check the robustness of our ndings we conduct a number of sensitivity tests. To begin with,
we recognize that our measures of banking development could be highly correlated giving rise to
a potential multi-collinearity bias in our estimates. In fact, Table 3 suggests that the correlations
between the banking indicators are of substantial magnitude. Therefore this issue requires further
attention. As a remedy we turn to a well-established technique { the Principal Component Analysis
4These results are not reported.
5Please refer to Schneider and Enste (2000) for a discussion on this issue.
7(Hotelling (1933), Pearson (1901)). The primary objective of this exercise is to reduce the dimen-
sionality of a set of highly correlated variables, such as our banking measures, by expressing their
common variation through so-called principal components. These principal components are orthog-
onal to each other so that each of them measures a particular aspect of banking quality. Based on
the Kaiser-criterion (Kaiser (1960)) and the screeplot we focus on the rst two principal components
of our seven variables, which together account for nearly 77% of the total variation in the data. In
Table 4 we report the factor scores of our banking indicators. The unrotated scores capture the
correlation of each of our variables with both principal components. To identify which aspects of
banking development each component is associated with, these correlations are typically rotated in
such a way that the variance along each new axis is maximized, while the relative position of the




The rotated factor scores depict a clear picture: The rst principal component is associated with
domestic credit to the private sector, domestic credit provided by banks and liquid liabilities as
percentage of GDP, all of which we used to construct our original measure of banking depth. By
contrast, the second principal component is associated with the share of private enterprise in bank
lending, the net interest margin on banks, bank overhead cost and the interest rate spread. Again,
it is the same set of variables that we originally used to construct our index of ineciency of the
banking industry.
Next, we use these two principal components as alternative measures of banking sector depth
and ineciency and include them in our baseline specication. As indicated in column 1 of Table
5, the coecients of both these two measures are not only signicant, but the manner in which
these alternative measures aect the size of a shadow economy is qualitatively no dierent from our
corresponding original indices.
A casual inspection reveals that, on the average, developed countries have smaller shadow
economies and better developed credit markets6. Thus there lingers a possibility of bias from an-
other source in our results. To verify this, we include information on the average log real GDP
6The correlation between log average GDP and our banking development measure is 0.7456. The correlations
between the average size of the shadow economy and log average GDP as well as banking development are -0.6530
and -0.7404, respectively.
8per capita from 2000 to 2004 in our base line regression (column 2 of Table 5) and nd a marginal
decrease in the coecient of the index of banking development, but nd no qualitative change from
our previous results.
Some researchers (e.g. Goldberg and Pavcnik 2003; Karlinger 2006) have argued that there could
exist a strong cross-country correlation between the `degrees of openness' and the size of underground
economies. This is primarily due to the fact that an increase in competition as a consequence of
reduced trade barriers and various market liberalization programs creates an environment where
rms are likely to engage in underground activities to cut down on the cost of their operations. To
control for such potential eect, we include `openness to trade' and a de-facto measure of nancial
integration in our base regression. We obtain information on these two variables from Heston,
Summer and Aten (2006) and from Lane and Milesi - Ferretti (2006), respectively. As before, our
results remain robust to changes in the set of control variables (please refer to Column 3 and 4 of
Table 5).
It has been widely recognized among development experts that nancial development is a multi-
faceted process that takes place through various distinct stages { from the emergence and expansion
of bank-intermediated debt nance to the materialization of stock markets and the increasing use
of equity as an additional instrument by which rms are able to raise funds (e.g., Gurley and Shaw,
1955, 1960; Goldsmith, 1969). In recent years, a substantial volume of empirical research that has
been directed towards understanding this process suggests that the level of banking development is
strongly correlated with the materialization and the level of maturity of stock markets. Accordingly,
one could treat the measure of stock market development as a proxy for the state of the banking
system. Taking this view, we include three stock market activity indicator - stock market value
traded, stock market capitalization and stock market turnover as percentage of GDP { separately
in our regression (please refer to columns 5 through 7 of Table 5). Qualitatively, these regressions
conrm our previous result, with all three measures of stock market development being signicant
at the 1% level. Quantitatively, a one percentage point increase in stock market capitalization, the
stock market value traded or stock market turnover, leads to a 0.051, 0.057 and 0.023 percentage
point decrease in the size of the shadow economy, respectively.
[TABLE 5. HERE]
93.3 Endogeneity
It is often the case that the factors which appear to in
uence the size of underground economies
are also in
uenced by the level of hidden activities. Indeed, such a possibility exists in our case.
For example, in many countries where the public sector plays a dominant role in banking, the lack
of public revenue resulting from a large shadow economy is likely to generate adverse eect on the
scale and the eciency of the banking sector. In other cases, being faced with a large shadow
economy, the public sector may choose to impose taxes, fees and other costs on the banking sector
as an additional source of revenue. Thus, at least in theory the size of the shadow economy could
in
uence the volume and the eciency of the banking sector. To address this concern, we follow
the footsteps of La-Porta et al. (1998) and Easterly and Levine (2001, 2008) and use dummies for
legal origins and a landlocked dummy as instruments for banking development. As an additional
instrument, we use a measure of ethnic fractionalization as obtained from Alesina, et al. (2003). In
Table 6 we report the coecients of interest from the rst and second stage regressions7.
[TABLE 6. HERE]
The rst stage results indicate that the chosen instruments explain the variation in banking
development quite well. Most individual coecient estimates, with the exception of some legal
origins, are signicant at the 1% level and a large value of the F-statistic of 57.78 indicates their
joint signicance8. Further, we are unable to reject the null of over-identication with a p-value of
0.6245 for the Hansen - J test. These results validate the choice of our instruments.
The second stage regression replicates our baseline OLS results with a highly signicant coecient
estimate of -0.334 on banking development. We interpret this result as strong enough evidence that
our earlier results were not driven by an endogeneity problem.
7La-Porta, et al. create dummies according to the origin of countries legal codices for each British, French, German
and Scandinavian origin. Easterly extends this data and further creates a dummy indicating whether a country is
landlocked (i.e. has access to ocean waters). Alesina et al. create a Herndahl-type index measuring how strongly a
country's populace is fractionalized into dierent ethnicities.
8In order for variables to be valid instruments they need to explain a sucient amount of the variation of the
potentially endogenous regressor. A simple test for whether this is actually the case suggests that the F-Statistic of
the rst-stage regression exceed ten to rule out such weak instrument issues (for a detailed discussion see e.g. Stock
and Yogo (2002)).
104 Conclusion
The eect of underground economies on economic and social development can be signicant and
far-reaching. High level of underground economic activities could undermine purposeful regulations
and deteriorate public nances to the detriment of public policy. For this reason it is important to
understand factors that are responsible for the size of a shadow economy.
In general, the size of a shadow economy is a re
ection of individuals' incentives to conceal
their activities. Existing literature has identied a number of factors (e.g., the burden of taxation or
regulation, the quality of government, legal enforcement, corruption etc.) that create such incentives.
Our central concern in this paper has been to study how the temptation to engage in underground
activities might be aected by conditions in the banking sector from which individuals acquire loans.
When individuals are required to disclose information about their wealth and income for acquiring
loans, the cost of going underground could transpire in the form of either reduced ability to borrow
and/or higher costs of borrowing. Such a cost is likely to be lower in countries where the availability
and terms of credit are inherently poor as a result of a poorly developed banking system. Accordingly,
one would expect the state of banking to have in
uence on the size of a shadow economy. After
controlling for the usual factors, we indeed nd that improvements in the quality of banking sectors
reduce the size of underground activities. Furthermore, improvements both in depth and eciency
of the banking industry play an equally important role.
While the primary objective of this paper has been to contribute to a better understanding of
the causes of underground activities, we believe that our results are also relevant in the context of
understanding a broader relationship between nancial and real sectors. Over the years a substantial
volume of research has been directed towards identifying the channels through which banking sector
development shapes the prospect of economic growth. In this pursuit, researchers have more or less
come to a consensus that banking development positively aects the volume and the productivity
of investment by creating opportunities for a greater pooling of risks, higher quality of information,
lower monitoring costs, lower transaction costs etc. The evidence presented in this paper indicates
another channel through which the banking sector development could in
uence economic growth,
namely through its impact on the size of the shadow economy.
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List of Countries
Albania, Algeria, Angola, Argentina, Armenia, Australia, Austria, Azerbaijan, Bangladesh, Belarus,
Belgium, Benin, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Botswana, Brazil, Bulgaria, Burkina Faso, Cameroon,
Canada, Chad, Chile, China, Colombia, Congo, Democratic Republic, Congo, Republic, Costa Rica,
Cote d'Ivoire, Croatia, Czech Republic, Denmark, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Egypt, El Sal-
vador, Estonia, Ethiopia, Finland, France, Georgia, Germany, Ghana, Greece, Guatemala, Haiti,
Honduras, Hong Kong, Hungary, India, Indonesia, Iran, Ireland, Israel, Italy, Jamaica, Japan,
Jordan, Kazakhstan, Kenya, Kuwait, Kyrgyz Republic, Latvia, Lebanon, Lithuania, Macedonia,
Madagascar, Malawi, Malaysia, Mali, Mexico, Moldova, Mongolia, Morocco, Mozambique, Namibia,
Nepal, Netherlands, New Zealand, Nicaragua, Niger, Nigeria, Norway, Oman, Pakistan, Papua New
Guinea, Paraguay, Peru, Philippines, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Russian Federation, Saudi Arabia,
Senegal, Serbia and Montenegro, Sierra Leone, Singapore, Slovak Republic, Slovenia, South Africa,
Spain, Sri Lanka, Sweden, Switzerland, Syrian Arab Republic, Tanzania, Tunisia, Turkey, Uganda,
Ukraine, United Arab Emirates, United Kingdom, United States, Uruguay, Uzbekistan, Venezuela,
Vietnam, Yemen, Republic, Zambia, Zimbabwe
Data Sources and Description
Shadow Economy: Average size of the shadow economy as percentage of GDP for the period
1999/2000 - 2004/2005. The size of the shadow economy is estimated using a dynamic multiple
inputs multiple causes (DYMIMIC) approach. Source: Schneider (2007).
Heritage Foundation Regulatory Freedom: Average of scores for the period 2000 - 2004. This
index ranges from 0 to 100 with higher values indicating more freedom. This index is based on
the number of procedures, time, cost and minimum capital required to start a business or obtain
a license and the time and cost to close a business together with the corresponding recovery rate.
Source: Heritage Foundation Freedom in the World Index.
Heritage Foundation Fiscal Freedom: Average of scores for the period 2000 - 2004. This index
ranges from 0 to 100 with higher values indicating more freedom. The taxation index is based
on highest marginal tax rates on individuals and on corporations as well as tax revenue. Source:
Heritage Foundation Freedom in the World Index.
World Bank Regulatory Quality: Average score for the period 2000 - 2004. These scores are
based on a variety of surveys and typically lie between -2.5 and 2.5, with higher scores indicating
better outcomes. This index assesses a government's ability to promote and enforce sound policies
and regulations based on a variety of indicators such as regulations of exports, imports and overall
entrepreneurial activity, competition, price controls, anti-trust regulation, etc. Source: World Bank
Governance Indicators (WGI).
Corruption: Average score for the period 2000 - 2004. This measure is a survey based index
of corruption ranging from 0 to 10 capturing the overall presence of corruption in the political and
public sector with higher values indicating a higher presence of corruption. Source: Transparency
International Corruption Perception Index (CPI).
World Bank Rule of Law: Average score for the period 2000 - 2004. These scores are based
on a variety of surveys and typically lie between -2.5 and 2.5, with higher scores indicating better
outcomes. The index assesses the quality of both the judicial system and of law enforcement to cope
14with a variety of illegal activity ranging from violent to white collar crimes. Source: World Bank
Governance Indicators (WGI).
Domestic Credit to the Private Sector: Average overall amount of domestic credit provided to
private borrowers as percentage of GDP for the period 2000 - 2004. Source: World Bank World
Development Indicators (WDI).
Domestic Credit provided by the Banking Sector: Average overall amount of domestic credit
provided by private depository institutions as percentage of GDP for the period 2000 - 2004. Source:
World Bank World Development Indicators (WDI).
Liquid Liabilities (M3): Average amount of outstanding liquid liabilities of the banking system
(M3) as percentage of GDP for the period 2000 - 2004. Source: World Bank World Development
Indicators (WDI).
Public Bank Assets: Average value of assets owned by central banks as percentage of total bank
(i.e. private and central bank) assets for the period 2000 - 2004. Source: Beck, Demirg u c-Kunt,
Levine (2000, 2006).
Interest Rate Spread: Average dierence between bank lending and deposit rates for the period
2000 - 2004. Source: World Bank World Development Indicators (WDI).
Net Interest Margin: Average value of banks' interest revenue as percentage of the value of banks'
total assets for the period 2000 - 2004. Source: Beck, Demirg u c-Kunt, Levine (2000, 2006).
Bank Concentration: Average value of the three largest banks' total assets as percentage of the
value of total banking sector assets for the period 2000 - 2004. Source: Beck, Demirg u c-Kunt, Levine
(2000, 2006).
Bank Overhead Cost: Average bank overhead cost as percentage of the value of banks' total
assets from 2000 - 2004. Source: Beck, Demirg u c-Kunt, Levine (2000, 2006).
Bank Liquid Reserves: Average value of bank liquid reserves as percentage of bank assets for the
period 2000 - 2004. Source: World Bank World Development Indicators (WDI).
Bank Capital: Average value of bank reserves and capital as percentage of total bank assets for
the period 2000 - 2004. Source: World Bank World Development Indicators (WDI).
Bank Non-Performing Loans: Average value of bank non-performing loans as a fraction of total
loans for the period 2000 - 2004. Source: World Bank World Development Indicators (WDI).
Risk Premium on Lending: Average dierence between bank lending rates and a "risk-free",
short-run government interest rate for the period 2000 - 2004. Source: World Bank World Develop-
ment Indicators (WDI).
Banking Development: Average score for the period 2000 - 2004. Source: Own calculations. This
score is the average of nancial depth and (100 - nancial ineciency) as described below. It ranges
from 0 to 100 with higher values indicating higher development of the banking sector.
Banking Depth: Average score for the period 2000 - 2004. This score is based on annual averages
of domestic credit provided to the banking sector, domestic credit provided by the banking sector and
liquid liabilities (M3). Each of these measures (or depending on its empirical distribution its natural
log) is normalized between 0 and 100 with a mean of 50 and a standard deviation of 20, higher
values indicating better nancial development. The exact transformation follows Calomiris and
15Beim (2001) and is given by: y = +x, where y is the normalized measure,  = 50  mean(x),
 = 20
x and x is each original indicator score or its corresponding natural log.
Banking Ineciency: Average score for the period 2000 - 2004. This scores is based on annual
averages of public bank assets, bank overhead costs, the net interest margin and the lending-deposit
rate spread, where each of these measures or its natural log is normalized between 0 and 100 with
a mean of 50 and a standard deviation of 20, higher values indicating larger nancial ineciencies.
Real GDP per Capita: Average real GDP per capita (Laspeyres) in 1996 international Dollars.
Source: Heston, Summer, Aten (2006)
Openness to Trade: Average exports and imports as percentage of real GDP per capita in 1996
international Dollars from 2000 - 2004. Source: Heston, Summer, Aten (2006)
Financial Openness: Average sum of outstanding foreign assets and liabilities as percentage of
GDP from 2000 - 2004. Source: Lane, Milesi-Feretti.(2006)
Stock Market Turnover: Average value of total shares traded as percentage of stock market
capitalization from 2000 - 2004. Source: Beck, Demirg u c-Kunt, Levine (2000, 2006).
Stock Market Capitalization: Average value of total listed shares as percentage of GDP from
2000 - 2004. Source: Beck, Demirg u c-Kunt, Levine (2000, 2006).
Stock Market Value Traded: Average value of total shares traded at each country's stock exchange
as percentage of GDP from 2000 - 2004. Source: Beck, Demirg u c-Kunt, Levine (2000, 2006).
British, French, German, Scandinavian Legal Origin: Dummy variable indicating whether a
country belongs to one of the three Civil Law groups. Sources: La Porta, Lopes-de-Silanes, Shleifer,
Vishny (1998), updated in Easterly and Levine (2001, 2008)
Ethnic Fractionalization: Ethnic fractionalization for each country is measured as one minus
the Herndahl Index of ethnic group shares, indicating the probability that two randomly selected
individuals belong to two separate groups. Source: Alesina, Devleeschauwer, Easterly, Kurlat,
Wacziarg (2003)
Landlocked Dummy: Dummy indicating whether a country has access to an ocean. Source:
Easterly and Levine (2001, 2008)
16Descriptive Statistics
Table A1. Descriptive Statistics
Variable Obs. Mean StDev Min Max Median
Shadow Economy 119 33.742 13.692 8.38 67.32 35.38
Heritage Foundation Regulatory
Freedom
119 41.384 16.751 10 90 38
Heritage Foundation Fiscal Free-
dom
119 78.795 11.551 10 100 80.34
World Bank Regulatory Quality 119 0.106 0.935 -1.988 1.898 -0.108
Corruption 119 5.836 2.235 0.2 8.9 6.62
World Bank Rule of Law 119 -0.032 1.002 -1.853 1.955 -0.32
Banking Development 119 50.135 16.577 5.547 92.893 47.658
Banking Depth 119 50.344 18.965 7.953 100 47.876
Banking Ineciency 119 50.031 16.577 16.331 91.600 49.695
Domestic Credit to the Private Sec-
tor
107 40.892 39.751 0.757 157.194 23.892
Domestic Credit Provided by the
Banking Sector
117 60.049 53.511 -31.608 303.018 45.828
Liquid Liabilities (M3) 107 50.079 37.860 5.141 238.391 41.609
Public Bank Assets 110 17.514 19.147 0.053 80.853 10.208
Interest Rate Spread 98 9.432 9.653 1.188 59.46 5.893
Net Interest Margin 117 5.836 3.588 1.054 23.155 5.244
Bank Concentration 117 68.090 18.235 23.436 100 67.152
Bank Overhead Cost 116 5.202 2.903 0.978 17.876 4.630
Bank Liquid Reserves 117 11.400 9.507 0.316 59.254 9.426
Bank Capital 90 9.294 4.160 2.94 26.725 8.71
Bank Non-Performing Loans 91 9.654 7.120 0.4 26.98 7.8
Risk Premium on Lending 58 6.681 8.085 -3.55 45.926 4.314
Real GDP per Capita 118 9,698.59 9,516.62 380.12 34,757.98 5,665.50
Openness to Trade 119 84.803 53.274 11.384 403.797 73.812
Financial Openness 115 2.062 2.218 0.426 15.957 1.508
Stock Market Turnover 92 49.896 71.748 0.131 371.585 21.531
Stock Market Capitalization 92 44.675 57.547 0.286 372.077 21.619
17Table A1. Descriptive Statistics
Variable Obs. Mean StDev Min Max Median
Stock Market Value Traded 92 27.928 47.847 0.004 233.236 3.787
French Legal Origin 111 0.460 0.501 0 1 0
British Legal Origin 111 0.279 0.451 0 1 0
German Legal Origin 111 0.036 0.187 0 1 0
Scandinavian Legal Origin 111 0.036 0.187 0 1 0
Ethnic Fractionalization 118 0.436 0.253 0.012 0.930 0.417
Landlocked Dummy 118 0.220 0.416 0 1 0
18Table 1. Baseline OLS

































R-squared is the adjusted coecient of determination. Numbers
in brackets are heteroscedascity robust Newey-West standard
errors; Signicance levels: *** 1%, ** 5%, * 10%.





Domestic Credit to the Private Sector -0.086***
(0.026)
0.634 117








Public Bank Assets 0.136**
(0.052)
0.625 111
Interest Rate Spread 0.338***
(0.137)
0.615 98






Bank Overhead Cost 0.758
(0.517)
0.617 116






Bank Non-Performing Loans -0.088
(0.217)
0.643 91
Risk Premium on Lending 0.245
(0.159)
0.708 58
R-squared is the adjusted coecient of determination. Numbers in brackets are
heteroscedascity robust Newey-West standard errors; Signicance levels: *** 1%,
** 5%, * 10%
20Table 3. Correlations between Financial Variables
privo bank M3 dbacba margin overhead spread
privo 1.0000 - - - - - -
bank 0.9299 1.0000 - - - - -
M3 0.8131 0.8146 1.0000 - - - -
dbacba -0.5015 -0.3582 -0.4486 1.0000 - - -
margin -0.5317 -0.4716 -0.5416 0.5037 1.0000 - -
overhead -0.4479 -0.4018 -0.4634 0.4629 0.7395 1.0000 -
spread -0.3804 -0.3253 -0.3634 0.3857 0.6405 0.4517 1.000
Table 4. Factor Scores for Financial Variables
Unrotated Factors Rotated Factors (varimax)
Component 1 Component 2 Component 1 Component 2
privo -0.429* 0.367 0.564* -0.031
bank -0.403* 0.481* 0.624* 0.070
M3 -0.427* 0.325 0.534* -0.060
dbacba 0.311 0.281 -0.031 0.418*
margin 0.403* 0.354 -0.047 0.534*
overhead 0.345 0.372 0.007 0.508*























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































22Table 6. Instrumental Variable Regressions (2SLS)
First Stage Regression Second Stage Regression




























N 111 N 111
F-Statistic 57.78 Hansen - J, P-Value 0.6245
R-squared is the adjusted coecient of determination. Numbers in brackets are
heteroscedascity robust Newey-West standard errors; Signicance levels: *** 1%,
** 5%, * 10%
23